Godly sovereigns, implementing humane stone-age punishments

By Jeg

Once again, Singapore's almighty legal system is playing God deciding with the life of a young Malaysian this time.

Yong Vui Kong, 21 years old has been set up to face the noose on 4th December 2009, his crime? Was caught in the drug's network as a drug mule.

Who's at fault this young man went the easy way? Poverty, poverty inflicted by selfish greedy governments.

The Asian mentality only repeats the echo preached by these governments. A man has committed a crime therefore the government must make sure stone-age punishment must be complied. And it will be as in the case of Yong Vui Kong.

He is following the same fate many others have in the past years, my mind is still clear when Van Tuong Nguyen was executed at his early 23 years. Van repented, he learned well, he admitted he did not do right by him, Van deserved a chance in life, Van could had been a great promoter of anti-drugs education, his life, his experience and his chances to do good were cut short by the almighty Singapore government.

Like with Van I am sure Kong has learned his lesson very well but is not only Kong the Singapore godfathers are murdering, it is the whole Kong's family that is being punished for the rest of their lives.

Kong has already prepared for the decision. The minute a "poor" person is being charged under drug laws in Singapore it means death as life sentences are too dear for the government to support. Kong will depart the dearly beloved in few more days as the judges conveniently took holidays, exactly the same as with Van Tuong Nguyen. If Kong would had been a wealthy kid in possession of the 47grs the records would read, "in possession of an amount under 15grs of whatever drug..." the perfect reading of the scales to save the wealthy kid's neck and be dictated a short sentence. Heeee... need to say more? Money talks in Singapore specially in these cases.

Their (Singapore lawmakers) humane upbringing can only see right straight up their arrogant noses, the crimes they are creating will continue because that is the only way for these high class officials and or lawmakers to make sure their investors, the drug dealers keep pouring their money into Singapore's economy. Burmese drug lord/s enjoy the good life in Singapore without a care of the poor back home.

Singapore makes the little man pay dearly with his/her life in order to protect the real criminals, the Drug Lords and the dealers. The mules are exterminated because that means 10 times more business for Singapore. For each mule out of the way 10 more are recruited. Silly the ones that get caught.

My questions:

If Singapore is so moralist clean then why so high the drug addiction in the state-city?
Why the majority of prisoners are drug addicts being pumped out?
What does it mean "chance to reform" to the government?
Who is learning (deterrent) from the execution of another human being?
What is it to learn?
Does cutting short the life of a person improves the statistics? on what?

Below you would read Andrew's and Alex' share on this topic, both Singaporeans that hope one day the Singapore law system would become more humane.

By Andrew Loh

Vui Kong, 21 years old as at Dec 2009.

Reading the comments on this thread on TOC here, I have mixed feelings. I am glad that most of the comments are supportive of the abolition of the death penalty. I am sad because of the types of comments by those who are against it.

Yong Vui Kong’s lawyer, M Ravi, is making a last-ditch attempt tomorrow morning (Wednesday, 10.30am) in the High Court to set aside Yong’s death sentence. He had gone to the courts on Monday to file his papers.

The registrar told him that all the judges of the appeal court were on….. vacation.

He added, according to what I was told, that there is, however, one judge available.

You may think, “Oh lucky”. Think again. An appeal is suppose to be heard by 3 High Court judges. And there are good reasons why this is so – especially in capital punishment cases which could be complex.

As it is with Ravi’s latest appeal – on the constitutionality of the sentence.

One judge?

It makes you wonder: Why did the courts or the Prison Service schedule an execution during a period when virtually all the judges go on vacation?

It is totally senseless to me.
Totally senseless.

But more than that, it shows the callous manner in which our country treats those it has deemed worthless. Those it is about to kill.

Kill.
I call it murder.

Yong’s mother was told today of her son’s arrest, incarceration and execution. Her mother, as I understand it, suffers from severe depression. Because of this, the family kept Vui Kong’s situation from her since his arrest in 2008. She had been asking and wondering where her son was this past year or so. When Vui Kong learned that he is to be murdered this Friday at dawn, he cried and wanted to speak to his mother one last time.

That was when the family decided to tell his mother about his sentence.

Vui Kong’s brother is now busy making preparations for his funeral.

Imagine.
Stop.
Stop.

Imagine.
Feel with your heart.
The pain of a mother.
That searing sense of hopelessness.
The desperation of a brother.
It’s like having your heart yanked right out from your chest.
Stop.

Vui Kong was 19-years old when he was arrested.

19.

What were you doing when you were 19?
Look at your friends who're 19.
How would you feel if you saw a 19-year old boy hanging by a noose?
How would you feel?
How do you feel?
Do you feel?

It is frightening.

Absurd.

Absurd that we think killing a 19-year old boy can somehow prevent drug traffickers from attempting to carry drugs into our country.

It is stupid.
When you think of how you might one day die, you’d probably think ‘old age’. Or ‘peaceful death’.
That’s what everyone would hope would be the way we leave this earth.

Then think again.
When you think you’re going to be murdered, by a government, declared so by judges in their distinguished robes, defended by one sole lawyer…
When you picture your death – hung by a noose until you breathe no more – it is visceral fear.

Yet, look at the callous manner in which we set about putting people to death.

Look at it.

Judges on vacation.

Deterrent.

Take away deterrent, what do you see?

You see that, if not for the deterrence purpose, one such as Vui Kong would not be deemed to deserve death.

The punishment does not fit the crime.

The deterrence argument reveals this.

Committing the crime does not bring you the death sentence.

It is for deterrence purposes that you get the death sentence.

The State wants you to die.

For deterrence purposes.

Not for what you actually did.

Sometimes, I feel as if my country no longer knows what it is. It no longer has a conscience.

How can it when all it has is a pragmatic sense of economics?

My country and my government are devoid of any sense of conscience.

Of this I am sure, now.

I am certain.

“I’ve got more important things to worry about.”

Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, when asked several years ago how many people S’pore has put to death.

“I’ve got more important things to worry about.”

Yet, it would be the only thing PM Goh worries about if the person to be hung was his child.

Such….. callousness.

Click here: http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Singapore/Story/STIStory_302234.html?vgnmr=1

Right click your mouse on the picture and "save image as" - and look.

Look at the label the ST gives Vui Kong.

"19druggie".

"Druggie".

That's what they call him.

Callousness.... or is it stupidity?

Or is it expediency?

I have no hope that Ravi’s last attempt will succeed. Not for any lack of trying on Ravi’s part, of course.

The man is just about the only one who’s tried his whole-soul best to save Vui Kong.

I have no hope simply because our system does not brook “highfalutin” ideas like humanity, humaneness, compassion.

The sanctity of Life.

Or the possibility of remorse.

As Aaron Ng once said in his blog when my country put Amara Tochi to death, I now say the same thing to Vui Kong, his mother, his brother, and his family:

I am sorry.
I truly am.
I am…

Close your eyes when the time comes, Vui Kong.
And breathe in peace.
Your last.

Don’t be afraid.
Don't be afraid.

They may take your life but they will not take our conscience.

I am so sorry.

------

Read this by Alex Au: http://www.yawningbread.org/arch_2009/yax-1074.htm

Alex is my friend and he is someone who is inspiring in the logical manner he goes about things - as in this entry on his website - where he takes apart the argument for the need for the death penalty and how we who are concerned can go about achieving this.

So, do tell your stories of anyone you know.

And please pass it on.

-----

Received by email:
President rejects clemency petition for Yong Vui Kong
By Andrew Loh

Another teenager caught, set to hang
by Alex Au

Teen drug runner to hang
By Elena Chong (Gov Media)

READ MORE---> Godly sovereigns, implementing humane stone-age punishments...

ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR BURMA

By Roland Watson

In the last three years, Dictator Watch has published intelligence about Burma's nuclear program from nine different sources. Information from well over ten other sources, including United States, South Korean and Indian intelligence agencies, has also been published by other NGOs and the media. There is a huge amount of intel now in the public domain. This article is an attempt to organize this information in a new manner, to illustrate more clearly what has been revealed - and may reasonably be conjectured - about the SPDC's program to obtain an atomic bomb.

That this program is real was underlined by Secretary Clinton's statement last July of U.S. concern "about the transfer of nuclear technology and other dangerous weapons" from North Korea to Burma. It was also affirmed by the recent comment of California Congressman Ed Royce, in a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, and questioning the Obama Administration's engagement policy with the SPDC, that the United States has five national security issues with Burma:

- North Korea is using Burma to transfer arms and contraband.
- Burma is buying technology applicable to a nuclear program.
- North Korean arms companies are very active in Burma.
- The U.S. blocked a North Korean cargo flight from proceeding from Burma to Iran.
- North Korea is helping to construct systems of tunnels in Burma, some of which will be used for nuclear facilities.

All of this raises an obvious question: How does one obtain an atomic bomb? What are the different steps in this process, and for each such step what is known about Burma?

In summary, a nuclear weapons program consists of the following elements:

1. Prospect for commercial grade uranium ore deposits and then mine the ore.

2. Mill the ore into a substance known as yellowcake (concentrated uranium powder). This is the first instance in which a security threat arises, because yellowcake, although of low radioactivity (emission of gamma particles), can be used by terrorists in a "dirty bomb."

3. Enrich the uranium. This involves mixing the yellowcake with fluorine to obtain uranium hexafluoride (this process requires a number of additional steps), and then melting and pressurizing the result to obtain uranium hexafluoriude gas. The gas is subsequently processed with centrifuges or via diffusion filtration to increase the percentage of the U-235 isotope. At low concentrations, the product may be used as reactor fuel (1-2% for heavy water reactors, 3-5% for light water reactors, and 12-20% for research reactors). At high concentrations (85% or more), it is suitable for manufacturing a bomb.

This is the second instance in which a threat arises, in this case of the production of an actual atomic weapon. However, one need thousands of centrifuges to obtain enough U-235, and weapons require a number of additional components and steps in their manufacture, including testing.

4. Construct a nuclear reactor, using low-enriched uranium as the fuel. Plutonium may be extracted from spent reactor fuel, with heavy water reactors yielding greater quantities. This plutonium can then be used to construct an atomic bomb. Further, there is an additional security risk at this stage, albeit local, of a reactor accident, such as occurred at Chernobyl in the Ukraine and Three Mile Island in the U.S.

5. Develop or acquire weapon delivery systems, such as ballistic or cruise missiles, which may also be used to convey high explosive and chemical and biological arms.

6. For such delivery systems, atomic weapons need to be miniaturized, to meet payload limits.

7. Where the technical and production capability is not available locally to complete any of the above steps, secure assistance from external parties. It is also conceivable that one could circumvent all of these steps and purchase a functional atomic bomb ready-made, including potentially of the miniaturized variety.

Uranium ore and mining

That Burma contains deposits of uranium ore is well known, and was even acknowledged by the SPDC itself on a page of its Ministry of Energy website (this page is now offline), which called for tenders from international mining companies. At least some of these deposits therefore are likely to be commercial. Dictator Watch sources have identified over ten ore deposits. The Kachin News Group in August 2009 revealed that since 2007 Russia has been extracting and shipping high grade raw uranium ore from mines in the Hpakant area.

Uranium milling and barter

Dictator Watch reported in November 2006 that the SPDC has a uranium mill at Thabeikkyin and that it is bartering yellowcake to North Korea and Iran. This intelligence was from a source that to our knowledge no one else has published. We subsequently received confirmation of such milling and barter in early 2007 and also 2008, including from other sources. The BBC's Burmese Service confirmed uranium milling from its own sources in August 2007. Ball and Thornton's "Tin Min" source was quoted in an Asia Times article this past August as saying that Burma businessman Tayza's Htoo Trading Company was involved in arranging shipments of uranium to North Korea, and he also confirmed Iranian contacts with the SPDC.

Dictator Watch further published satellite images of a suspected uranium mine and mill on the Myit Nge River. There are at least two mills currently in operation, and we note that most commercial mines would have associated mills, to reduce ore transport costs.

There is now little doubt that the SPDC is supplying uranium to the secret enrichment programs of both North Korea and Iran. These programs are the two most serious nuclear weapon proliferation threats in the world today, and both nations are the subject of United Nations Security Council sanctions (North Korea - Resolution 1874, Iran - Resolution 1737), of which the SPDC trade is a clear violation.

Dictator Watch also published in 2007 news that yellowcake had been offered for sale in Bangkok. We now understand that this was by at least two sets of Burmese brokers (and which trade may be ongoing), one of which referred to a sixty kilogram supply at a nearby industrial estate. (Note: This supply was never confirmed, but according to our sources the brokers appeared legitimate.) For reference, the discovery of five pounds of yellowcake (2.3 kg) in 2003 in Rotterdam (not from Burma) was international news. As noted, uranium is not an ideal substance for a dirty bomb, but even so the psychological effect of such a weapon attack on, say, New York City, Paris or Tokyo, would be incalculable. In the sixty kilogram case the brokers said that the supply originated from a Wa general. They also said they could provide industrial quantities, but demanded an amount far in excess of the world uranium price.

Uranium enrichment

We were the first party, in January 2007, to report the possibility of a uranium enrichment program in Burma. Our sources subsequently revealed that an enrichment facility is being developed in Thabeikkyin, which is supported by the recent news that the SPDC bought equipment that could be used to make centrifuges from a North Korean company through a Japanese trader, who has just been found guilty in a related court case.

The SPDC instituting uranium enrichment is an extremely worrying development. However, there is as yet no evidence that the scale of the operation is large enough to produce the quantities of U-235 required for weapons production. It should, though, be subjected to close scrutiny by the IAEA.

Nuclear reactor and plutonium

Russia signed an agreement in 2000 to provide a light water research reactor to the SPDC, which was a duplicate of the first proliferation step taken in 1964 between the Soviet Union and North Korea. The general reactor location was stated as the Magwe Division, and a number of specific prospective or related sites including Myothit, Natmauk, Taungdwingyi and Myaing have been identified.

The program with Russia was suspended in 2005, when the SPDC experienced financial difficulties. It was resumed in 2007, following the worldwide energy price increases which filled the junta's bank accounts - from sale of natural gas to Thailand through the Total-Chevron Yadana pipeline. (Russia is also being paid in mining concessions.) During the suspension period, the SPDC approached North Korea as an alternative supplier. (The Far Eastern Economic Review reported sightings of North Korean technicians in the Magwe area in 2003, so some form of cooperation had already been established.) Iran was asked for assistance as well.

An Asia Times article in 2004, derived from Indian Intelligence, said that North Korea was paid $2 million to conduct a reactor survey in Myothit, and that the total assistance program would comprise $200 million over several phases. Dictator Watch sources say that the Russian reactor deal was finally concluded, for a used but functional 10 MW reactor, which was to be disassembled, shipped to Burma, and then reassembled, and with startup slated for the end of 2008. Russia would provide the reactor, but North Korea would be heavily involved in its construction and operation. (India had also been approached for a reactor, but refused to provide one if its technicians would not be in charge of the operation.)

North Korea began to sell related reactor technology to the SPDC in 2006, which is the same year that it started to receive yellowcake shipments.

It is at this point that the reactor situation for Burma becomes confused. There is no firm evidence that the Russian reactor has been delivered. Moreover, following a strong earthquake in Magwe in September 2003 (reported by Irrawaddy), suspicion developed that the site was moved to the Setkhya Mountains (which are southeast of Mandalay, long-known to have nuclear related facilities, and which lie near the Myit Nge River). Dictator Watch sources say that a reactor is to be built in Kyauk Pa Toe township of Thabeikkyin, which would complete a vertically-integrated operation there: nearby mines, mill, enrichment facility, and reactor. Ball and Thornton report that there are actually to be two reactors, in Myaing and the Setkhya Mountains. Whatever the site or sites, the program is designed to enable the extraction of plutonium from spent reactor fuel, and the production of sufficient quantities of Plutonium-239 to make atomic weapons.

Nuclear weapons

In 2001, Science and Technology Minister U Thaung said to Burma Army officers who were to be sent to Russia to study nuclear technology that the program's goal was to produce an atomic bomb by 2020. Former Foreign Minister Win Aung, who died recently in Insein Prison, said to such State Scholars at this time that China supported the objective.

This time frame is reasonable for a weapons program based on enriched uranium, provided the SPDC can acquire or manufacture enough centrifuges. Ball and Thornton argue that via the reactor-based plutonium extraction method, the SPDC may be able to build a bomb by 2014. It is also important to recall the option of outright weapon acquisition. Than Shwe is constructing a defense against a foreign military intervention, of which having nuclear arms would be the bulwark. It seems unlikely, considering how - thanks to Total, Chevron and other multi-national corporations - his financial fortunes have improved, that he would not attempt to purchase one directly from North Korea. Of course, he would pursue both uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction programs, in emulation of the North, but as these take years he would inevitably be attracted by a straightforward purchase. (This is also one way that the North could make up for assassinating South Korean officials in Rangoon in 1983.)

Than Shwe has the ability to pay whatever Kim Jong-il might demand, even hundreds of millions of dollars for a single weapon, if need be. (He is so wealthy now that he has constructed an imperial city.)

Note: Such acts do happen. The Washington Post just reported that China in 1982 gave Pakistan enough enriched uranium (50 kilograms), and a basic blueprint, to construct two atomic bombs. The U.S. became aware of, but never disclosed, this transfer.

Missiles

Dictator Watch has reported a great amount of intelligence about the SPDC's efforts both to acquire and produce a wide variety of missile systems, including land and ship based, SAM, TOW, rockets, and ballistic missiles. The most worrisome of our intelligence is that the SPDC has purchased short range ballistic missiles (SRBM) from North Korea, with a range of 300 miles, and that these have been placed at at least four locations near Burma's border with Thailand. We also reported that both Russia and North Korea are helping the SPDC build factories to produce rockets and other precision-guided munitions.

Missile proliferation to Burma is now well-documented. Kyodo News reported in 2003, from a U.S. intelligence source, that Burma was negotiating to buy North Korean missiles. The Congressional Research Service reported in 2006 the sale of ballistic missiles by North Korea to other countries, although Burma was not mentioned. More recently, the evidence includes the United States efforts in the summer of 2008 (noted by Congressman Royce) to deny a North Korean cargo flight airspace rights over India to fly from Burma to Iran, and which cargo reportedly included missile components; and the U.S. shadowing of the Kang Nam 1 freighter this past summer, which had a similar cargo.

On the other hand, even though the SPDC has acquired sophisticated missile systems, it is unlikely to possess the miniaturization technology necessary to scale down nuclear weapons to the requisite size. Only China, which has developed the technology domestically, and which also secured designs from the U.S. through espionage (the W-88 design), would be in a position to transfer the technology to Burma, and also North Korea, but in the present day would be unlikely to do so to either. (Russia as well can almost certainly be ruled out as a source of the technology.) The only rationale for having such missile systems, therefore, defaults to their use as part of a defense against a foreign intervention.

(One wild card, though, is the presence of Pakistani nuclear scientists Muhammad Ali Mukhtar and Suleiman Asad in Burma since 2001, escapees of the A. Q. Khan network. (Khan was the individual who received the earlier mentioned Chinese enriched uranium.) Both scientists are weapons design experts, and were connected to the charity UTN, other Pakistani scientists from which the CIA learned briefed Osama bin Laden - in mid-2001 - on how to make nuclear weapons. Source - Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, via the History Commons website)

SPDC defense plans

Than Shwe takes the threat of a foreign intervention very seriously. It is one of his principal fears. Over the last few years he has devised and put in place an integrated defense plan.

The first element of this plan is his move to Naypyidaw, which may be viewed as his fort. Distant from the ocean, it would require an invading force to make a lengthy and hazardous incursion. (He is emulating Burma's kings of old.)

For air defense, there are SAM and anti-aircraft batteries spread around the country, in addition to a small fleet of MiG-29s. For defense against a naval approach, he has initiated a plan to produce sea mines, with North Korean assistance. He further has extensive and widely displaced heavy weapons, to counter a ground assault.

Naypyidaw itself has a heavily armed defensive perimeter, with numerous Burma Army battalions, as well as underground command and control bunkers (again, with the associated tunnels built with North Korean assistance, and which Democratic Voice of Burma and Irrawaddy have documented).

Perhaps most seriously, our sources say that Than Shwe has designated Thailand as its nearest enemy, and that he has a plan to trigger a military incident with the country in the event that his rule in Burma is threatened. It further appears likely that extortion is a significant element of this plan.

One may deduce that SPDC representatives, in discussion with Thai officials, have made reference to the SRBMs pointed at Thai airbases (including in northern Bangkok). In addition, there is speculation that the SPDC has threatened to cut off the natural gas supply, if, for example, Thailand allows the United States large scale access to its military facilities. It is worth repeating the recent language of the junta's representative, that the SPDC "would not allow" Thailand to be used as a base for attacks against it. You can't make such a bold statement as this, and on Thai soil, without something to back it up.

United States engagement

The U.S. is now engaging the SPDC, supposedly to try something new. It has announced the laudable goals of support for human rights, the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, and the promotion of democratic reform. This shift in turn has given many Burmese hope. The sheer presence of some movement after years of stagnation is a welcome relief.

We are sorry to have to say this, but there is no good reason for hope. We at Dictator Watch are cynical. We wonder: what is really behind the new policy?

The U.S. has said that it is "fact-finding," but this is absurd. It already knows the facts. It has reported, annually and for years, the human rights abuses and religious persecution committed by the SPDC. (Of note, Burma under supposedly Buddhist Than Shwe is perhaps the only Buddhist society in history where other religions have been persecuted.)

The U.S. also knows the facts about Burma's nuclear and missile programs, as evidenced by its drone flights over the country and also the blockade of North Korean air and sea cargo shipments. The U.S. undoubtedly has a massive Burma intelligence program, dating to Ne Win's visit to the White House in 1966, if not to World War II.

The United States is trying to buy some time. Given the State Department's announcements that engagement will be a long, slow process, the Administration clearly wants a lot of time.

There is always so much more to diplomacy than what is publicly revealed. For example, the U.S., U.K., and France chose not to make helicopter aid drops to the victims of Cyclone Nargis, even though such aid would have saved many lives. They apparently feared an SPDC attack on the helicopters, which would not only have threatened their personnel but forced a decision on how to respond. These countries could invade Burma, at any time, and the SPDC's defenses notwithstanding, free the country. One would think that they would welcome the opportunity.

Has Than Shwe threatened to rain missiles down on Thailand, thus creating an international incident of such gravity that the U.S. simply must defer? Is the SPDC even already in possession of an atomic weapon, and has it made this fact quietly known?

Again, we should consider the import of the failure of the State Department to publish the JADE Act Section 10 Report on Military and Intelligence Aid to Burma. Secretary Clinton and President Obama, by blocking the report, are breaking a law that they personally approved. In addition, the Act says that the report is to be prepared annually (like the human rights and religious persecution reviews). Will publication of the second edition also be denied next January?

One might argue that the report is being suppressed, so as not to undermine the present engagement. However, consider Iran, with whom the U.S. also is engaging. Washington revealed that Iran has a second, secret uranium enrichment facility in a cave near the city of Qom, and whose purpose can only be weapons related. The policy of engagement with Iran did not block the release of this bombshell.

The only reasonable conclusion about the JADE Act report is that its contents are so incendiary that they simply cannot be disclosed without causing profound international consequences. In the face of this complete lack of transparency, and which flies in the face of President Obama's campaign pledge of openness, one can only assume the worst.

Viewed another way, the threat is apparently so severe that the Administration is using the cover of "pragmatism" to shield its indecisiveness about how to respond.

(Note: A critical point is if the U.S. has told Daw Suu what it knows about the SPDC's nuclear program, or if she is being kept in the dark as well.)

Conclusion

An interesting question is why there are so many intelligence sources out of Burma? Why is the SPDC filled with leaks?

The people of Burma, including the rank and file military, despise the generals. Other than a small clique at the top (and Total, Chevron, etc.), everyone wants change. Mizzima recently published two letters from soldiers of the Tatmadaw, asking the simple question: if we risk our lives to bring down Than Shwe, will you the International Community back us? These soldiers are not asking for boatloads of weapons, simply that the world be prepared to act to neutralize SPDC attempts to suppress such an internal effort at change.

The tipping point for Burma requires international support. This type of act would truly be a step in a new direction. The so-called "new" engagement with the SPDC is actually a continuation of the same old failed policy. It has been packaged this way to deceive, and is not materially different from what has been tried before. Because of this, it is almost certainly bound to fail as well. (Than Shwe, by appearing to show a willingness to cooperate, is also buying time.)

The proper approach is to call the junta's bluff. The lives of the fifty million people in Burma, regional security, and ultimately United States security, are at stake.

President Obama's willingness (or not) in Singapore tomorrow to shake the hand of the front-man of a gang of mass murderers will be an important signal of if U.S. policy truly now supports the Burmese, or if, for all the smoke and mirrors - the flurry of diplomatic visits, nothing has really changed.

With all the U.S. press conferences now being held about Burma, would one journalist with access to them please specifically ask about the missing JADE Act report?

November 14, 2009
Dictator Watch Org

For More reports on Burma

READ MORE---> ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR BURMA...

China - Burma-United States Relations

By Roland Watson
October 8, 2009

Note: This article was prepared for a seminar of the Asia Democracy Alliance in Washington, D.C., which Dictator Watch co-sponsored, in the Rayburn House of Representatives office building. It analyzes the relations of Burma with both China and the United States, including the impact of the Obama Administration’s policy of engagement.

Pertinent history

There was a military coup in Burma in 1962, by General Ne Win. There is suspicion that the CIA was involved in the coup, and also the British, Israeli and French secret services.

United Sates regional policy for East Asia at that time was dominated by the goal of containing the Chinese communists. Ne Win was viewed as a good ally in this effort.

Shortly after the coup, in 1963-64, the U.S. provided radar stations to Ne Win. Following widespread anti-Chinese riots in Burma in 1967, the U.S. sent surface to air missiles and artilleries, including 105 mm howitzers, 75 mm recoilless rifles, 106 mm recoilless rifles, etc. All of this was meant for defense, in case of an attack on Burma by China.

Burma Army officers received training in the U.K. and the U.S. The U.K and Israel also reportedly trained BA intelligence personnel.

Declassified State Dept. cables from the period show that the U.S. quickly developed a positive relationship with Ne Win. As early as 1965, he offered to host negotiations between the U.S. and Vietnam in Rangoon. He also provided regular advice to the U.S. about the region including in 1966 that it should not withdraw from Vietnam, and on the nature of China's communist leaders. For the Chinese, he commented on their “extreme narrow-mindedness and parochialism.”

Ne Win was invited to the U.S. by President Johnson, and visited the White House in 1966. He later bought houses in the U.K., Germany and Switzerland.

One U.S. appraisal of China at the time comes from a 1965 cable about the China Reporting Program, which was a secret effort to counter Chinese propaganda:

“The growth of Chinese Communist influence and capacity for subversion confronts us throughout the less developed areas of the world. With over three decades of pragmatic experience in psychological warfare and without the restraints imposed by generally accepted norms of international conduct, the Chinese communists have made impressive psychological gains in those areas. Their output is great in volume and professional in form.”

In the 1960s, the United States actively opposed Chinese propaganda. It no longer does so. And, the Communist Party of China (CCP) has now had an additional forty-five years to increase and strengthen its program, which is nothing less than the largest and most sophisticated propaganda and censorship machine in human history.

Another significant factor is that after their defeat by the communists in 1949, some 15,000 Chinese Nationalist troops (Kuomintang – KMT) took refuge in the Laos - Burma border areas. The U.S. supported evacuations of these troops to Taipei, but some 5,000 irregulars remained, and which Taipei continued to assist. This residual Nationalist force on China's southwest flank was an irritant to the CCP. The KMT also had a plan, although it was not implemented, to attack China in Yunnan and ally with the ethnic minorities there after the Korean War broke out.

Many groups inside Burma were opposed to Ne Win, such as the students (the ABFSU – All Burma Federation of Student Unions). Another significant opponent was the Communist Party of Burma (BCP), which was initially formed in the late 1930s to fight the British (when Burma was still a colony of the U.K.). Following the 1962 coup, and superficial negotiations the following year between Ne Win and the BCP, significant conflict broke out between them. This civil war continued for decades, and with China providing substantial support to the BCP starting after the 1967 riots. The BCP became the most important regional ally of the CCP.

The U.S. continued to support Ne Win through the Reagan years, under the cover of its anti-narcotics program. For example, two Bell helicopters for drug interdiction were shot down in 1984 by the Karen National Union (KNU), which was not involved in drugs. The Karen protested to the U.S., but got no reply.

U.S. allies also supplied arms to the regime. Germany built a factory to make G-2 and G-3 assault rifles, G-4 light machine guns, MG-42 general-purpose machine guns, MA-10 rocket launchers, and BA-103 rocket launchers. Switzerland sold PC-6 and PC-7 aircraft, and which were later used in a 1988 attack on the Karen headquarters at Manerplaw.

To summarize this history, one can say that prior to the popular uprising in Burma in 1988, the U.S. supported Ne Win’s junta and China opposed it. This changed with the West ending its support following the 8888 massacre.

China also dropped its support of the BCP at this time, leading to the Party’s collapse. This change actually developed out of the secret deal reached during Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing: that China would not support regional communist parties if the U.S. would refrain from again becoming involved in conflict in S.E. Asia. Thai and Malay communist parties also lost CCP support. (One wonders if this agreement is still active.)

Some of the ethnic armies in the northeast of Burma, notably the Wa (United Wa State Army - UWSA) and Kokang (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army - MNDAA), were built on the remnants of the BCP, and have had good relations with China since that time. They were among the many ethnic armies, particularly in Shan State, that signed ceasefire agreements with Burma’s junta in the late 1980s and early 1990s, reportedly following prodding from China. These ceasefires split the Burma ethnic armed resistance, and was a successful use by the regime, with CCP assistance, of the tactic of divide and conquer. The CCP has been pursuing a buffer policy with Burma through these ceasefire groups ever since.

China’s interests with Burma

China has strategic and economic interests with Burma.

The first strategic interest is that the CCP does not want Burma to become democratic. Such an event would inflame the democratic aspirations of the Chinese, and also give hope to the Tibetans, East Turkestanis and Southern Mongolians. The CCP will basically give the military regime of Burma whatever it wants, to ensure that this does not happen.

China also uses Burma in its strategic positioning with India, with which it has both military and economic competition. There are additionally three specific disputes: over the Aksai Chin area of Kashmir, which China took in the Sino-Indian war in 1962; Arunachal Pradesh (which China refers to as Southern Tibet); and the fact that the Dalai Lama uses India as his base.

China has built an Indian Ocean deep-water port at Kyaukpyu on Burma’s southwest coast, and it has an electronic intelligence operation directed at the Indian military on Great Coco Island.

China’s economic interests for Burma are focused predominantly on the supply of energy and other natural resources. In November 2008, China signed a deal to build two pipelines across Burma. The first, from Yunnan (Kumming) to Kyaukpyu, is for oil and will open a new, shorter route for Middle East and African supplies. (It avoids the Malacca Strait.) The second, from Yunnan to Burma's gas fields, is for natural gas. Construction on the pipelines was supposed to have started in September, and is to be completed by 2013.

China is also the principal partner in two new dams on the Salween River in Eastern Burma, one in Karen State and the other in Shan State. It is providing 50% of the funding for the Karen State dam (Hat Gyi), for which technical surveying has been completed.

China further is pursuing large mining ventures in Burma, including operating a nickel mine, being the sole customer for the output of a tungsten mine, etc. China is also the driving force behind the deforestation in Burma’s northern forests, and the exploitation of Burmese jade and other gems.

In summary, to satisfy its strategic and economic interests, China has changed its Burma policy since 1988 and become the regime's principal ally.

What the SPDC gets

The current military junta in Burma, the State Peace and Development Council, receives general diplomatic support from the CCP, in the form of regular statements that Burma's problems are internal and that the world shouldn't interfere. This is then backed up by a veto against - or other types of maneuvering to avoid - all prospective United Nations Security Council action on the country.

The SPDC is already receiving large sums from the sale of its resources to China. When the new pipelines are brought on stream, this will jump to billions of dollars each year.

China has also provided large-scale funding for infrastructure in Burma, notably roads and bridges and now dams and pipelines, together with a related supply of Chinese engineers.

China provides extensive military equipment and assistance, including trucks, jets, and ships; heavy weapons such as 130 mm artillery and 120 mm mortars; light arms, although these are often of substandard quality; and training.

It is now public knowledge that Burma is pursuing a nuclear program, with North Korean and Russian assistance. (Dictator Watch prepared a comprehensive investigation of this program, with the first of many articles published in November 2006.) While China is not believed to be directly involved in the proliferation, it has encouraged the SPDC to acquire nuclear weapons, and the relationship of the regime with North Korea could not proceed without CCP approval. There have also been reports that North Korean nuclear technology is now being transported overland to Burma through China (following shipment blockades – by the U.S. – by air and at sea).

Recent developments with China

The SPDC in August betrayed one of its ceasefire agreements and attacked the Chinese-ethnicity Kokang (MNDAA). The Kokang have been driven from their territory, even though they have lived in the area since Burma’s feudal days. Some 37,000 refugees fled to China. An unknown number have returned. Thousands of Kokang troops surrendered in China to the PLA.

It has been reported (by the Kachin News Group) that the Burma Army used chemical weapons on the Kokang. The victims – Kokang fighters – said that gas was released when a mortar shell exploded. Their symptoms included bleeding eyes, nose and ears, dizziness, and difficulty breathing. Military sources report that shells with distinctive yellow, red and green markings have been transported to Burma Army camps in eastern Shan State, and that the shells are from North Korea.

There has further been a pattern in recent years of massive Chinese migration into northern Burma. In last month, though, the SPDC ordered 10,000 Chinese business people in the border areas to leave. (This has been disputed by China.)

There is now great concern that the Burma Army will attack the larger and stronger ceasefire groups in north and northeast Burma, including the Kachin (Kachin Independence Army - KIA) and Wa, who have refused orders from the SPDC to transform into border militias under Burma Army command. New conflict is considered possible at any time, and these groups are on high alert. The Kachin and Wa have been recruiting and training soldiers in recent months, and are prepared to fight, but they reportedly won't act first under orders from China. The Wa actually began to move to defend the Kokang, with whom they have a mutual defense pact, but then did not. (Some reports said that about 1,500 UWSA troops went to the Kokang area and began fighting, but that the MNDAA collapsed too quickly.)

This pact is known as the MPDF, or Myanmar Peace and Democracy Front. It includes the KIA, UWSA, MNDAA, and the NDAA - National Democratic Alliance Army - Eastern Shan State, which is also known as the Mongla.

China is now building a series of refugee camps across from the Kachin and Wa areas.

In summary, it appears that the SPDC has become hostile to China's ethnic allies. The plan of the junta leader, Than Shwe, is clearly to consolidate his rule over as much of Burma as possible, before his advancing age forces him to relinquish control. He no longer wants the ceasefire groups to have de-facto independence.

Perhaps more importantly, these groups are debating participating in the SPDC’s upcoming 2010 general election, which is a pivotal part of Than Shwe’s plan. This election will be based on Burma’s 2008 Constitution, which was passed in a fraudulent referendum and which will give the military a monopoly on power and that will be impossible to change.

Than Shwe needs popular legitimacy for the vote, to support his allies around the world when they argue that the election should not be rejected out of hand. These allies include U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Japan, Singapore, the E.U., and in the U.S academic David Steinberg, Senator Jim Webb, and, most worryingly, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Having the ceasefire groups participate in the election is much more important than their reorganizing as a border guard. Than Shwe’s position is that they must agree to vote, or face the ultimate penalty.

Interestingly, the CCP appears ready to accept the SPDC’s attacks against its allies (as signaled by its role disarming the Kokang, the building of the new refugee camps, etc.). The reason for this is that if the junta can extend its control over all of Burma, this will make it even stronger and hence more difficult for Burma’s pro-democracy movement to overcome. China’s first strategic interest with Burma will be enhanced, which seemingly, at least to Beijing, is worth the betrayal of the Kokang, Wa and Kachin. (Note: there may well be disputes within the CCP, between Yunnan officials who are upset at these events and the Politburo back in Beijing.)

Of course, there are no guarantees that military action against the Wa and Kachin will be successful. For this reason, even with all the bluster, conflict on a widespread scale is unlikely. If the Burma Army does attack, and suffers high casualties, this would deepen fault-lines that are already known to exist. A coup against Than Shwe would become much more likely.

Recent developments with the U.S.

There has been serious fallout from the long-debated and now finally announced U.S. policy shift to engagement with the SPDC. Most importantly, Than Shwe has been emboldened. The engagement policy is all carrot and no stick, and there has been no punishment for his many misdeeds: the renewed imprisonment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; attacks against the Kokang and also the Karen (and for the former with chemical weapons); a renewed pattern by the Burma Army of using rape as a weapon of war; and other such heinous acts. Engagement with the SPDC is therefore an odd policy: Than Shwe and his fellow generals are ruthless fascist/Nazi-like extremists, with whom negotiations have been and almost certainly will continue to be a complete waste of time.

The SPDC realized, when the review was announced at the beginning of the year, that American policy had actually already changed. For example, there was no longer a threat that the U.S. would assist Thai border-based resistance groups such as the KNU, Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), and Shan State Army – South (SSA-South). (While the Bush Administration had not provided such help, this possibility couldn’t be ruled out.) This precipitated the unusual rainy season offensive against the Karen, and it has also freed up troops for operations in Shan State. The policy weakening was further likely a factor in the harsh treatment of Daw Suu.

Of even more concern, though, is that there are now credible reports of a new assassination plot by the SPDC. There is word that Than Shwe has ordered the execution of the leaders of any ceasefire groups that refuse to become border militias or support the 2010 election; of leaders of non-ceasefire armed resistance groups; and of other pro-democracy leaders who oppose the election. While this might be psychological warfare, it cannot be dismissed as an empty threat. The junta assassinated Padoh Mahn Sha, the General Secretary of the KNU, in February 2008. Than Shwe now appears intent on systematically eliminating all opposition.

It is conceivable that U.S. engagement motivated this, and that it will result in a wave of assassinations. Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, should have confronted the SPDC about this when he met its officials last week at the United Nations.

The U.S. must correct its flawed diplomatic signals. Further, the Administration must refrain from strong-arming Daw Suu and the National League for Democracy to relent over sanctions and to participate in the upcoming election. Indeed, the U.S. policy shift has so unsettled the Burma pro-democracy movement that the following questions can legitimately be asked. Should the monks and the students abandon their hopes of organizing a new popular uprising? Should the KNU and the other ethnic groups stop defending their people? Should everyone just wait to be saved by America?

The preferred U.S. policy for Burma is as follows: Oppose the 2010 election; organize an international arms embargo; instigate a crimes against humanity investigation; provide cross-border IDP aid; sanction Chevron; support the pro-democracy armed resistance; and, lastly, release the long-delayed JADE Act Section 10 report on Military and Intelligence Aid to Burma (which would confirm the nuclear threat).

Summary

Before 1988, the United States supported Burma’s military rulers, and China opposed them. These positions then reversed following 8888. But, it now appears that the U.S. is changing sides again, and joining China in supporting the SPDC.

This shift to engagement is also evident for U.S. policy towards China (where containment has been publicly renounced). Prior administrations would mention the terrible state of human rights in China, and send important signals of their support for democracy by meeting such individuals as the Dalai Lama. It unfortunately if not amazingly now appears to be the case that there is no room for the promotion of democracy in President Obama’s foreign policy.

What this implies is that freedom for the people of Burma has become even more remote. They truly are on their own. Moreover, freedom for Burma will likely require freedom for China first. (This is analogous to how freedom for East Timor required freedom for Indonesia first.) It is extremely difficult, though, to envision how this might happen now that the U.S. has also dropped freedom and human rights from its China agenda.

The only positive possibility is that President Obama is simply drawing a clear line between himself and former President Bush; that he expects engagement will fail (including with Iran and North Korea); and that when it does he will announce, “we tried,” and then move on to stronger measures and with multilateral support. However, while this might make sense (Obama’s no fool – he understands that there is no real hope for engagement), and while it would constitute an ingenious chess move on the world stage, he shouldn’t forget that the longer he delays strengthening American policy, the more people will die as tyrants take advantage of its present weakness.

Dictator Watch

READ MORE---> China - Burma-United States Relations...

Disspointment on Congressional US Policy "one-sided" Hearing

Dr. Kyi May Kaung addresses Senator Webb

This is a letter to Senator Webb, expressing disappointment on Wednesday's Congressional US Policy Hearing, from a respected friend, Dr Kyi May Kaung. To many of you, she may require no introduction - but to the rest of you, read on and you will learn.

"We must take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the oppressed. Sometimes we must interfere. . . There is so much injustice and suffering crying out for our attention . . . writers and poets, prisoners in so many lands governed by the left and by the right." Elie Wiesel, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech, 1986, Oslo.

Senator Webb,

I was disappointed by your Hearing yesterday, which I saw as rather one-sided. No representatives of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, her lawyer Jared Genser, representatives of the National League for Democracy, or the NCGUB (the Exile Government, elected to their constituencies in Burma in the 1990 elections), Burmese refugees and dissidents, Burmese monk survivors of the 2007 Saffron Revolution, the US Campaign for Burma, scholars who have not advocated removing sanctions, representatives of major non-profits working for change in Burma, other stakeholders or known strong supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi such as Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Barbara Boxer, Diane Feinstein or Mitch McConnell were present. Here is Sen. McConnell’s “two tests for the new US policy from his website: http://mcconnell.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=318402&start=1

I request that you place this Statement on the official record of the Hearing of September 30th, 2009.

You conducted the Hearing single-handed and was noticeably harsher in your questions towards Kurt Campbell, who explicated the new US policy and took a measured approach, and towards Professor David Williams, who was the only one among the witnesses who mentioned gross human rights violations in Burma and the stepped up military campaigns against the ethic minorities, being conducted right now as military attacks against the Kokang Chinese, the Rohingya in the west, the Kachin in the north and in addition to the on-going longest civil war against the Karen in the east. In many cases it was the Naypyidaw (former Rangoon government) which violated the ceasefires.

Professor Williams said, “Before the 2010 elections, the mountains will flow with blood.” The continuous and constantly increasing stream of refugees into all the neighboring countries are evidence of this.

Dr. Williams also testified that he thought after 2010 it would not be a civilian government, though it would be civilianized. As Burmese, we have seen too much of the trick of army brass changing into civilian clothes and continuing in power, directly or from behind the scenes, to think much of the promises of the 2010 so-called “election.” Professor Williams concluded by saying “This effort won’t shift the game, it will only give the game away.”

I am relieved that the US State Department’s new Burma policy will in fact be a limited engagement policy, subject to concrete and substantial changes (political and economic reforms of a structural nature) on the part of the Burmese military regime, and that the US government reserves the right to impose or extend sanctions whenever it sees fit.

Please allow me to tell you who I am and my qualifications for talking about Burma.

I am a Burmese-born scholar and long time democracy advocate who has been studying Burma all her adult life. My 1994 Ph.D. dissertation from the University of Pennsylvania was on the detrimental effects of a highly centralized command economy and the political economy of Burma in relation to those of Zaire, the then Soviet Union, India and the People’s Republic of China. I studied the design of political-economic systems and the rundown economies produced by having a dictatorship or one party system. My thesis is on Scholarly Commons http://repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/AAI3116650/

available from Proquest http://repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/index.221.html

and a summary available from Asian Survey

http://caliber.ucpress.net/toc/as/35/11

I also study the economic relationship between nations and I was the first to start pointing out in 2002 that to study Burma we also need to look at China and India. Today, I am happy to see this view is being increasingly taken up, including by you at yesterday’s Hearing.

In addition I have publicly debated David Steinberg and others about sanctions and Burma several times since 2002. Here are some links –

http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3917

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/7026645.stm

For the BBC Hardtalk interview, I went at the request of the NCGUB or National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma or the Exile Government, as one of the members of their Technical Advisory Network.

I have been closely associated with The Free Burma Coalition when it was working on sanctions, with The Burma Fund and the NCGUB. Most recently, (winter of 2008-2009) I worked on a Transition Plan for Burma, commissioned by the NCGUB. I compiled the plans and ideas of 6-7 internationally recognized scholars and Burma experts; several economists; including an expert on money and banking and economic development; a human geographer who has studied Burmese agriculture extensively and is alarmed about the mass landlessness taking place in Burma as the junta takes over the land of Cyclone Nargis victims; an MP of a western government friendly with Burma and constitutional scholars. I also looked at past papers prepared for the democracy movement since 1990. These consultants published and unpublished works are much more detailed and show a much better understanding of Burma than anything that David Steinberg or Thant Myint U have ever written. In fact these two and others in the same camp are widely known as regime apologists. Maybe that is why they were invited onto your panel.

To my knowledge (I stopped work on this project in mid-March 2009), none of the scholars and dissidents consulted advocated lifting sanctions. Most of the experts instead advocated structural reforms of a political and economic nature. The sentence “Sanctions will be gradually lifted” did work its way into the official report, after it had passed from my hands, but this can be seen as subject to concrete changes from the SPDC’s side, and in line with Daw Suu’s recent letter indicating her willingness to help lift sanctions and asking to be better informed. She cannot truly make an informed decision without access to the internet and other international media as she continues under a more severe house arrest since the sham trial conducted against her, towards the end of which you were allowed to see her.

My advice to you and Secretary Clinton and everyone working on this new policy is to be extremely careful that you are all not used by the junta, while Burma is left worse off than before 2010.

In my opinion you need to show you are not more motivated by playing to an American audience by going to secure American Mormon John Yettaw’s release, and talking about recovering the bones of US war dead from World War II in Burma, but not even issuing a statement or making any moves to help in the case of Burmese-born US Citizen Kyaw Zaw Lwin (Nyi Nyi Aung) who was arrested on Sept 3 as he arrived at Rangoon airport from Bangkok. See – Jonathan Hulland “As an American is Tortured in Burma, Where’s the Outrage?”

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-hulland/as-an-american-is-torture_b_303297.html

This article was published two days ago and has already been widely cited and linked on the Internet.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U Tin Oo of the NLD, Kyaw Zaw Lwin and all the more than 2000 political prisoners need to be free and able to freely organize and conduct their political activities. Otherwise 2010 will remain the farce it is.

I will be cc.ing this statement to Amnesty International and other organizations and individuals.

I commend you for your spearheading efforts, but much more needs to be done.

The SPDC needs to be held accountable for its actions. Otherwise you are sending the wrong message.

Sincerely,

Kyi May Kaung (Ph.D.)

READ MORE---> Disspointment on Congressional US Policy "one-sided" Hearing...

Junta's fiction, torturous reality

Interview with 88 Generation Student member Myo Yan Naung Thein

Unofficial AAPP translation of interview with Democratic Voice of Burma 23 September 2009

88 Generation Student member Myo Yan Naung Thein was released by the military government along with other prisoners. He was released from Thandwe prison in Arakan State. 35 year-old Myo Yan Naung Thein has suffered severely from a neurological disease that has left him unable to walk. He was arrested on 15 December 2007 and given a 2 year sentence, charged under section 505b of the Penal Code. He was released three months before the completion of his sentence. He said he was released from Thandwe prison on 19 September, and arrived at home on 21 September. “We were told in the afternoon of 18 September that we would be released. And they give us 1000 kyats (1$) for the traveling costs to get back home. But we weren’t released that day because they were waiting for a fax from the district local authority. So we were released on the morning of 19 September,” said Myo Yan Naung Thein.

Please explain how were you arrested?

In the afternoon of 15 December 2007, while I was on the phone to my Mom at a shop on the corner of Hledan Junction, two men grabbed me by the hands. They were very strong. They had tattoos and looked like criminals. I shouted out because I thought that they had kidnapped me by mistake. And then one of them grabbed me by the throat, put his hand over my mouth, and pushed me into a taxi. They hooded me, and I was forced to lie down in the taxi. One of them sat on top of me.

Where did they take you?

I don’t know where they took me because I was hooded.

What happened next?

As soon as I got there, they started to kick and punch me. They forced me to kneel on all fours like a dog, and one of them sat on my back.

What did they ask you anything?

They asked me, “Do you know Soe Tun? Where is Nilar Thein? Where are Zaw Min alias Baung Baung, and Htay Kywe?”

Why did they imprison you?

I was accused of allowing Zaw Min alias Baung Baung to stay at my home, and giving wrong information to 88 Generation Student Soe Tun and Win Zaw from DVB. For those reasons, the authorities charged me under Section 505b [of the Penal Code].

How did they interrogate you in the Interrogation Center?

At first I didn’t know where I was taken. Those men were really violent and rude to me. Later I found out the people who took me were from Military Affairs Security. They asked me about Min Ko Naing, Ko Ko Gyi and Htay Kywe. Mainly they asked about Soe Tun. Soe Tun and I worked together in the 1996 student movement, we both had leading roles, and we were arrested and imprisoned in the same case. Finally I realized I was in the Interrogation Center. They tortured me very brutally. My hands were tied behind my back, they kicked and punched me. They locked me in a dark wet room with no windows. I didn’t know whether it was day or night.

How was your health after you were sentenced?

I was sent to Insein Annex prison and put in a cell. One of my legs was deteriorating day by day. I already suffered from a neurological condition once in 1991. So I informed prison authorities that I couldn’t move, because of nerve damage. But they didn’t care. A prison medic came and saw me but he was a normal doctor, not a Neuro-Specialist. So I requested to meet see a Neuro-Specialist but they ignored my request. Then the nerve damage got so bad I couldn’t move my legs at all. My mother sent request letters to the prison General Director many times, and the exile media also reported on my case. So finally I got a chance to see a Neuro-Specialist, and he told me my hands were also affected.

How long did you stay in Thandwe prison?

I was transferred to Thandwe prison after sentencing. Actually, I had an appointment with a doctor at Rangoon hospital [at that time]. But they sent me to Thandwe prison anyway, without any consideration about my appointment. They transferred me to Thandwe prison, because it is really far away from home and very cold, and because they thought it would help my health!

How was it in Thandwe prison?

We – me, Zaw Min Zin, Maung Latt and Maung Than – were transferred to Thandwe prison. We were all handcuffed. They put everyone in iron shackles except me. They carried me because I couldn’t walk. They didn’t allow me to urinate during the journey to Thandwe prison, which took the whole night. It was so hard on me.

Did you sign a pledge?

Yes, we were released under section 401. It’s not a pledge exactly, but we will have go back to prison and serve the remainder of our sentences if we are arrested again for political activities.

How do you feel about your release?

I feel nothing, because I was close to completing my sentence. There are 10 political prisoners in Thandwe prison. Now two were released, and the others were not. If they are honest, they will have to release all political prisoners because they are talking about national reconciliation. Ko Win Maw, the guitarist from the band Alinkar, is in bad health and suffers from asthma. At night, sometimes he can’t breathe properly and then he almost falls unconscious. There are no medics, no doctors, and no proper medical care.

How’s your health condition after your release from prison?

I can’t stand up or walk. I can only walk if I have a person on either side to help me.

Now that you are released, what are you going to do next?

It’s the second time for me to be released from prison. I was in prison first when I was 22 years old because I was involved in the 1996 student movement. I was released in 2003. After Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi were released, I worked with them, the 88 Generation Students. So I was imprisoned again. We sacrificed a lot. I will have to carry on until we get democracy in Burma. As a student, I didn’t really know about politics. I only knew that the military government is wrong. So I rebelled and demonstrated against the military government. Their rule is totally wrong for Burma. Because of that, they arrested and cruelly imprisoned me. After we were imprisoned, we learned more and more about the injustices carried out by the military government, and that strengthened my beliefs even more. So who will keep fighting if we don’t? We have to carry on. But for the moment, I still don’t know about the current situation in Burma. I need to learn, and wait and see for a while. I am sure I will carry on, but I don’t know how.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/20312820/Interview-With-88-Generation-Student-Myo-Yan-Naung-Thein-AAPP-Translation
September 28th, 2009

READ MORE---> Junta's fiction, torturous reality...

Commemorating 2nd Anniversay of the Saffron Revolution

Saffron Revolution monks, refugees, exiles, and supporters from the Southeast Asian country of Burma (Myanmar) are joining forces with Tibetan and Iranian protesters to commemorate the 2nd Anniversary of the Saffron Revolution at the United Nations – Dag Hammarskjold Plaza this Wednesday afternoon, while Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Burma’s leading pro-democracy leader, remains under house arrest and imprisonment, as she has since 1988.

When:
Wednesday, September 23, 2009, from 2:00 – 4:00 PM

Where:
United Nations - Dag Hammarskjold Plaza (47th Street and 2nd Ave.) NY

Press Release_September 23rd Event

READ MORE---> Commemorating 2nd Anniversay of the Saffron Revolution...

Laogai: The Machinery of Repression in China

Available from Umbrage Books
Review by Roland Watson
September 20, 2009

There has been a growing tendency in recent decades, particularly in diplomatic affairs involving the United States, European Union and Australia, to downplay the extent of the human rights abuses committed in China. The argument behind the position is that the new generation of Communist Party of China (CCP) officials is sincerely reform-oriented, and that given time they will improve the human rights situation in the country to an acceptable standard.

The new book, Laogai - The Machinery of Repression in China, completely discredits this argument. It describes in brutal detail and with shocking photography how the state-sponsored terrorism of the CCP against the people of China, which began in the Mao era, continues unabated.

Laogai means "reform through labor;" put simply, the term designates a prison labor camp. There are over 900 documented Laogai in China, although the true number is believed to be much greater. The total prisoner population is as high as five million. While the majority of this figure are real criminals, it also includes some 500,000 people who have been detained without cause. Indeed, anyone in China can be sentenced to the Laogai, and at any time and for any reason. The camps are the common destination for people who speak up for their rights, either as individuals - to protest wrongs that they or their family have suffered - or on behalf of Chinese society at large. They are also the destination for arrested practitioners of Falun Gong. Camp treatment for prisoners, of whatever background, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and includes hard labor, torture, rape, and execution, and with the harvesting for sale - by the prison commanders - of the organs of the people who are murdered.

The fact that these abuses occur on such an abominable scale, without strong and on-going condemnation by other nations, reflects two factors.

The first is that the CCP is now much better at, or perhaps just more concerned about, hiding its crimes. Formerly, the Party would kill millions in broad daylight. Now, with the modern media spotlight, it has decided to be more discreet.

Secondly, most nations have become so intertwined economically with China, if not dependent on it - think of the $800 billion portfolio of U.S Treasury Bonds owned by the CCP, that to protect their own interests they have decided it is better to be silent about the abuse.

A similar situation was the acceptance by the Bush Administration of the use of torture in its so-called "war on terror." It is a classic "the ends justify the means" position.

The CCP on October 1st will celebrate the 60th anniversary of its military victory over the Chinese nationalists (who escaped to, and have now established an independent democracy in, Taiwan). This is not a cause for celebration. During the past sixty years, there have been upwards of eighty million unnatural deaths in China, from Party-driven murder and starvation.

The rule of the CCP taken as a whole constitutes the worst crime ever committed in human history. Because the Party remains in power, this crime is still in progress. The people of China have yet to receive the justice that they so gravely deserve.

The outrages of the CCP, though, extend beyond its repression within China's borders. The world would do well to reconsider its "realist" stance. The Party is a leading patron of North Korea and Iran, and the developing nuclear threats that they represent (not to mention China’s own DF-31 nuclear armed ballistic missiles, which have a range of 5,000 miles and can reach both Europe and the West Coast of the United States). It also supports the dictatorial regimes in Burma and Sudan, and may be viewed as a sponsor of the crimes against humanity that they are committing. The CCP further is responsible for the enslavement and assimilation of the peoples of Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia.

Laogai - The Machinery of Repression in China, is a compelling and irrefutable resource. It provides the first ever, comprehensive documentation of China's prison camp system, including the use of prison labor to produce consumer goods for sale in the West; the widespread practices of capital punishment, public execution and organ harvesting; and also of the CCP's now international - through the Internet - propaganda and censorship machine.

The book reveals the secrets that the CCP is doing its best to hide, and which the world's political leaders would prefer to ignore. It is an essential bulwark of truth about the present-day situation in China, against the Communist Party's 60th anniversary wave of propaganda lies.

Burma Wants Freedom & Democracy ~ Laogai: The Machinery of Repression in China
Available from Umbrage Books
Review by Roland Watson
September 20, 2009

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